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Many studies have attempted to determine how effective the European Com-
munity Common Agricultural Policy has been at meeting its stated objectives. 
However, in trying to estimate the costs associated with certain parts of the 
program, mnany times the larger overall question is forgotten: Are the bene-
fits justifying the costs? This afternoon, I will outline the apparent bene-
fits of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereafter referred to as CAP) and the 
costs incurred. I will indicate not only the specific costs and benefits to 
the European Community, but also how the CAP interacts with world agricultural 
markets. I will pay particular attention to the current debate among U. S. 
Farmers about the competition from European farm products. By outlining the 
costs and benefits of the program, I hope to indicate what major policy prob-
lems are facing the CAP. 
As outlined in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, the CAP of the European 
Community was formulated to insure a fair standard of living for the agricul-
tural community, to stabilize markets, and to assure the availability of sup-
plies. A major policy tool used to reach these goals is the variable levy 
system. I will briefly explain how variable levies work, and follow with my 
analysis of how well this system has achieved its goals. 
The mechanics of the variable levy vary across products, but the basic 
features are similar. A threshold price is set which guarantees producers a 
level of income support. Producers whose costs exceed this threshold receive 
a subsidy. Producers whose costs are below the threshold are, in turn, taxed. 
That is, if the threshold price is above the world price, imports of agricul-
tural products are taxed while high-cost European producers receive subsidies. 
The variable levy supports the European producers' income by distorting prices 
of agricultural products inside the European Community. 
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By affecting agricultural prices in the Community, variable levies have 
sent a wrong signal to high-cost producers. These producers do not face the 
lower world price but the higher threshold price. Thus, they are given an in-
centive to increase their output over and above the quantity they would nor-
mally supply at the world price -- to a higher quantity associated with the 
threshold price. Remember, the threshold price is almost always higher than 
the world price. The threshold price, with the variable levy, was designed to 
meet one of the conditions specified in the Treaty of Rome: to stabilize the 
market for agricultural products. By stabilizing product prices through the 
threshold price, that is, not allowing agricultural-products prices to move 
with world prices, an incentive was created for the European producer to over-
produce. From a position as a net importer of grains in the early 1970's, the 
European Community is now roughly self-sufficient in grains, and estimates of 
future production range as high as a five million ton net export of grains by 
1985.1 The benefits of CAP have been price stability and self-sufficiency in 
the production of many goods. However, there have been costs associated with 
these gains. 
The major cost of this program has been borne by the consumers of agricul-
tural products in the European Community. They have paid higher market prices 
resulting from the variable levy system. Many estimates of the magnitude of 
these costs exist. One, the per family cost of implementation of the policy, 
has been estimated as high as $175 annually. Other estimates range as high as 
3% of Community GNP.2 
Another problem associated with the variable levy system is funding the 
subsidies once the Community becomes a net exporter. As a net importer, all 
grain imported to the European Community was charged a levy equal to the dif-
ference between the threshold and world prices. The net importing position of 
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the EC as a whole allowed it to collect taxes in greater amounts than the sub-
sidies paid out. Thus, the EC continued to collect a surplus as long as it 
was a net importer and the threshold price remained above the world price. 
As the EC becomes a net exporter, it will have to pay subsidy amounts greater 
than the levies collected. There are two ways to cover the increased subsidy 
payments. One alternative is reallocation of tax revenue from other sources. 
This is at best a short-run response; the magnitude of the subsidies will con-
tinue to increase as European agricultural production increases. Another al-
ternative for the EC is to set the threshold price below the world price. The 
economics of the situation demand that high-cost European producers be taxed 
rather than subsidized. The political problems of such a reorientation of 
policy are, obviously, significant. Also, after sending a subsidy signal to 
producers for 25 years, a major change in policy would create dislocation in 
the agricultural sectors of Community countries. Jhere would be underutiliza-
tion of capacity, increases in unemployment, and most probably agricultural 
bankruptcies. 
Another reason for the CAP to exist is for the support of incomes in the 
agricultural sector. In general, agricultural incomes are below the industri-
al average in most countries, although the exact difference is difficult to 
measure. Given the price supports generated by the va)':"iable levy system, wage 
differentials seem to have narrowed by an insignificant margin. That is, the 
gains from higher prices are not going to labor. So, where are they going? 
Rents accrue to the productive factor in the most inelastic supply. The re-
turns to land, fixed in supply, increases while the returns to labor, mobile 
in supply, stay constant or increase slightly. Between 1973 and 1978, agri-
cultural land values increased 13% per year in France, 30% in the Netherlands, 
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and 16% as a community average.3 So, while farm wages increased roughly the 
same pace as non-farm wages, the value of the land was increasing rapidly. 
For countries where the land tenure system is mostly owner-operated, the 
CAP has indeed increased farmers' wealth. However, it has done little to help 
their liquidity. That is, the variable levy system has acted to increase the 
value of one of the farmer's most illiquid assets. 
Neither do the effects of the CAP fall evenly on all EC countries. Net 
exporting countries of agricultural products within the Community are enriched 
by net importing countries. That is, EC countries supplying grains to other 
EC countries sell at the threshold price. So, the net importing countries are 
transferring wealth to the net exporting countries through the artificially 
high threshold price for goods. 
Also, the CAP affects agricultural producers in other parts of the world. 
Countries outside the EC with agriculturally-based economies must compete in 
world markets with EC agricultural output. The CAP encourages the EC to be-
come a net exporter, so other exporting countries may be hurt. If the CAP en-
courages enough exports to significantly affect world prices, other grain ex-
porting countries will lose revenues due to lower world prices. For example, 
consider a country with an agricultural sector more efficient than the EC. In 
the absence of CAP, this country may be a major supplier of grains to the EC. 
But, EC policy forces this country's goods out of EC markets. This loss may 
have severe impact on the potential supplier to the EC. That is, not only has 
this country lost agriculture revenue, but it may be more difficult to trade 
with EC members for other goods. For a developing country, the agricultural 
trade provides inroads to trade in more modern technology, or at least a 
supply of hard currency for future transacti ons. However, the entrance of EC 
products to the world market, if it depresses world prices, may help net 
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importing countries. They will pay less for their goods. But, in the long 
run, depressed world market prices will most likely slow the growth of export-
able agricultural products from these countries, and potentially hinder devel-
opment. 
Producers of U.S. farm products are getting a great deal of political 
mileage and newsprint out of the effects of European surpluses on the world 
market price for their goods. U.S. farmers are faced with declining world 
prices due to the increased production in Europe. The declining price is a 
result of the competition of European agricultural products in markets where 
the U.S. formerly supplied the majority of goods such as the developing coun-
tries of Africa and Asia. The response by u.s. farmers to these conditions 
has been to call for increased protection from the U.S. government in the form 
of higher parity prices and the signing of long term trade contracts to guar-
antee sales to foreign markets. 
Clearly, the increased output from European farms has made it more diffi-
cult for u.s. farmers to sell their production domestically and abroad, but 
the call for greater protectionism is counter-productive. As all trade wars 
in the past have shown, greater protectionism never solves the problem. In 
fact, a root of the production problem is the agricultural policy of the u.S. 
and EEC. By protecting their agricultural sectors, both governments have en-
couraged inefficient production and agricultural surpluses. The economic 
problem, i.e., surpluses in agriculture due to inefficient production, can be 
solved by removing the governmentally provided protection. The irony of this 
situation is that both groups involved in this debate are among the most 
protected agricultural sectors in the world. Clearly, high degrees of protec-
tionism have only exacerbated the problems. 
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The political problem is more complex, that is, dismantling the current 
agricultural subsidy systems while minimising the short run dislocations. Un-
fortunately, governments tend to respond to short-run problems at the expense 
of long-run solutions. The EC is currently facing a major crisis in agricul-
ture which is intensified by the current problems in France. Agricultural 
Ministers are realizing that the CAP must be modified to allow more competi-
tion in the agricultural sector. It would be unfortunate if the U.S. did not 
learn from the European problem. Increasing u.s. price supports and tariffs 
on agricultural goods will not solve the farm problem domestically. It will 
only lead to higher market prices for consumers, growing surpluses, and inef-
ficient production. Clearly, a return to competitive agricultural markets 
would be the best solution but is currently politically infeasible. However, 
a move by the u.s. to greater protectionism just when the EC is being forced 
to decrease governmental intervention would be a poorly advised move. 
In summary, the CAP does seem to have stabilized community market prices 
and assured the EC of agricultural self-sufficiency. However, it does not 
appear to have decreased the agricultural wage differential. So, two of the 
goals outlined in the Treaty of Rome have been met, but at what cost? Consum-
ers of agricultural products in the EC have paid higher prices. Overproduc-
tion has been encouraged by high threshold prices. The threat of the EC be-
coming a net exporter of many agricultural products is creating a potentially 
severe budget problem. A net transfer of wealth from agricultural product 
consumers to landowners has occurred because the rents accruing to the agri-
cultural sector as a result of the CAP have gone toward increasing land val-
ues. Other countries with more efficient agricultural sectors than the EC 
have been closed out of the EC market. Net agricultural product exporting 
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countries within the EC are expropriating wealth from net importing countries 
through the threshold price. 
At this point two questions come to mind. First, is the success of the 
CAP in meeting the objectives stated in the Treaty of Rome worth the costs? 
This question still has not been answered satisfactorily in part because of 
problems with quantifying the actual benefits. The second and potentially 
more important question is whether or not the objectives stated in the Treaty 
of Rome are really an appropriate set of goals for an agricultural program? 
Before concluding, I would like to comment on the objectives stated in the 
Treaty of Rome. The benefit of stable prices is essentially that uncertainty 
about crop values is decreased. However, with the recent growth of futures 
markets for most agricultural products, the risk of price variation can be 
hedged away by both producer and processor. So, while price stability may 
have been a reasonable objective when the Treaty of Rome was written, its va-
lidity as a policy target may have diminished. 
The objective of self-sufficiency is a very complex issue. If trade flows 
cease because of political reasons or warfare, self-sufficiency is clearly 
worthwhile. Another justification for self-sufficiency is to stop the ability 
of potential cartels to expropriate the EC's wealth. The possibility of an 
agriculture cartel forming with the power of OPEC is clearly small, and given 
the recent history of OPEC, would probably be short-lived. The only real 
question is how tenuous is the EC's link to major suppliers of agricultural 
products. Clearly, large reliance on Eastern-bloc producers would be risky, 
but close alliances with the west, i.e. Canada and the u.s., allow EC access 
to agricultural products with a high degree of certainty. 
Finally, should agricultural policy concern itself with the wage differen-
tial between farm and non-farm workers? To give a short answer to this is 
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difficult, but essentially if farm labor is fairly mobile, workers will mi-
grate to areas and sectors with higher real wages. In fact, the CAP may have 
hindered the capitalization of agriculture by creating incentives for laborers 
to remain in agricultural activities. If indeed farm labor is immobile, then 
policies may be advised to diminish the wage differentials. But, direct 
transfers would be easier to administer without having the distorting influ-
ence of the variable levies. 
Granted, the concern with reorienting the objectives of the CAP is evading 
the short run problem of how to revamp the CAP given its current shortcomings. 
However, without a consistent and appropriate set of long run objectives, any 
changes in the CAP will simply add to the problems already in existence. 
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